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Though popular accounts celebrate the legions and an assortment of charismatic commanders quickly vanquishing massive hosts of "wild barbarians", [40] Rome suffered a number of early defeats against such tribal armies.

As early as the Republican period circa — BC , they had sacked Rome under Brennus , and had won several other victories such as the Battle of Noreia and the Battle of Arausio.

Henceforth, July 18 was considered an unlucky date on the Roman Calendar. Some writers suggest that as a result of such debacles, the expanding Roman power began to adjust to this vigorous, fast-moving new enemy.

The circular hoplite shield was also enlarged and eventually replaced with the rectangular scutum for better protection.

The heavy phalanx spear was replaced by the pila, suitable for throwing. Only the veterans of the triarii retained the long spear- vestige of the former phalanx.

Such early reforms also aided the Romans in their conquest of the rest of Italy over such foes as the Samnites, Latins and Greeks.

In the early imperial period, however, Germanic warbands inflicted one of Rome's greatest military defeats, the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest which saw the destruction of three imperial legions and was to place a limit on Roman expansion in the West.

And it was these Germanic tribes in part most having some familiarity with Rome and its culture, and becoming more Romanized themselves that were to eventually bring about the Roman military's final demise in the West.

Ironically, in the final days, the bulk of the fighting was between forces composed mostly of barbarians on either side.

Whatever their particular culture, the Gallic and Germanic tribes generally proved themselves to be tough opponents, racking up several victories over their enemies.

Some historians show that they sometimes used massed fighting in tightly packed phalanx-type formations with overlapping shields, and employed shield coverage during sieges.

In open battle, they sometimes used a triangular "wedge" style formation in attack. Their greatest hope of success lay in 4 factors: a numerical superiority, b surprising the Romans via an ambush for example or in c advancing quickly to the fight, or d engaging the Romans over heavily covered or difficult terrain where units of the fighting horde could shelter within striking distance until the hour of decision, or if possible, withdraw and regroup between successive charges.

Most significant Gallic and Germanic victories show two or more of these characteristics. The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest contains all four: numerical superiority, surprise, quick charges to close rapidly, and favorable terrain and environmental conditions thick forest and pounding rainstorms that hindered Roman movement and gave the warriors enough cover to conceal their movements and mount successive attacks against the Roman line.

Another factor in the Romans' defeat was a treacherous defection by Arminius and his contingent. Weaknesses in organization and equipment. Against the fighting men from the legion however, the Gauls, Iberians and Germanic forces faced a daunting task.

The barbarians' rudimentary organization and tactics fared poorly against the well-oiled machinery that was the Legion.

The fierceness of the Gallic and Germanic charges is often commented upon by some writers, and in certain circumstances, they could overwhelm Roman lines.

Nevertheless, the in-depth Roman formation allowed adjustments to be made, and the continual application of forwarding pressure made long-term combat a hazardous proposition for the Gauls.

Flank attacks were always possible, but the legion was flexible enough to pivot to meet this, either through sub-unit manoeuvre or through the deployment of lines farther back.

The cavalry screen on the flanks also added another layer of security, as did nightly regrouping in fortified camps.

The Gauls and Germans also fought with little or no armour and with weaker shields, putting them at a disadvantage against the legion. Other items of Roman equipment from studded sandals, to body armour, to metal helmets added to Roman advantages.

Generally speaking, the Gauls and Germans needed to get into good initial position against the Romans and to overwhelm them in the early phases of the battle.

An extended set-piece slogging match between the lightly armed tribesmen and the well-organized heavy legionaries usually spelt doom for the tribal fighters.

Weaknesses in logistics. Roman logistics also provided a trump card against Germanic foes as it had against so many previous foes.

Tacitus in his Annals reports that the Roman commander Germanicus recognized that continued operations in Gaul would require long trains of men and material to come overland, where they would be subject to attack as they traversed the forests and swamps.

He, therefore, opened sea and river routes, moving large quantities of supplies and reinforcements relatively close to the zone of battle, bypassing the dangerous land routes.

In addition, the Roman fortified camps provided secure staging areas for offensive, defensive and logistical operations, once their troops were deployed.

Assault roads and causeways were constructed on the marshy ground to facilitate manoeuvre, sometimes under direct Gallic attack.

These Roman techniques repeatedly defeated their Germanic adversaries. The Gallic also demonstrated a high level of tactical prowess in some areas.

Gallic chariot warfare, for example, showed a high degree of integration and coordination with infantry, and Gallic horse and chariot assaults sometimes threatened Roman forces in the field with annihilation.

At the Battle of Sentinum for example, c. The discipline of the Roman infantry restored the line, however, and a counterattack eventually defeated the Gallic forces and their allies.

The accounts of Polybius leading up to the Battle of Telamon , c. The Gauls met comprehensive defeat by the Roman legions under Papus and Regulus. Chariot forces also attacked the legions as they were disembarking from ships during Caesar's invasion of Britain, but the Roman commander drove off the fast-moving assailants using covering fire slings, arrows and engines of war from his ships and reinforcing his shore party of infantry to charge and drive off the attack.

During the clash, the chariots would drop off their warriors to attack the enemy and retire a short distance away, massed in reserve. From this position, they could retrieve the assault troops if the engagement was going badly, or apparently, pick them up and deploy elsewhere.

Caesar's troops were discomfited by one such attack, and he met it by withdrawing into his fortified redoubt. A later Gallic attack against the Roman camp was routed.

Superb as the Gallic fighters were, chariots were already declining as an effective weapon of war in the ancient world with the rise of mounted cavalry.

However, they were no longer used in an offensive role but primarily for the pre-battle show - riding back and forth and hurling insults.

The main encounter was decided by infantry and mounted cavalry. Superior Gallic mobility and numbers often troubled Roman arms, whether deployed in decades-long mobile or guerrilla warfare or in decisive field engagement.

The near-defeat of Caesar in his Gallic campaign confirms this latter pattern but also shows the strengths of Roman tactical organization and discipline.

At the Battle of the Sabis river, see more detailed article contingents of the Nervii , Atrebates, Veromandui and Aduatuci tribes massed secretly in the surrounding forests as the main Roman force was busy making camp on the opposite side of the river.

Some distance away behind them slogged two slow-moving legions with the baggage train. Engaged in foraging and camp construction the Roman forces were somewhat scattered.

As camp building commenced, the barbarian forces launched a ferocious attack, streaming across the shallow water and quickly assaulting the distracted Romans.

This incident is discussed in Caesar's Gallic War Commentaries. So far the situation looked promising for the warrior host. Early progress was spectacular as the initial Roman dispositions were driven back.

A rout looked possible. Caesar himself rallied sections of his endangered army, impressing resolve upon the troops.

With their customary discipline and cohesion, the Romans then began to drive back the barbarian assault. A charge by the Nervi tribe through a gap between the legions however almost turned the tide again, as the onrushing warriors seized the Roman camp and tried to outflank the other army units engaged with the rest of the tribal host.

The initial phase of the clash had passed however and a slogging match ensued. The arrival of the two rear legions that had been guarding the baggage reinforced the Roman lines.

Led by the 10th Legion, a counterattack was mounted with these reinforcements that broke the back of the barbarian effort and sent the tribesmen reeling in retreat.

It was a close-run thing, illustrating both the fighting prowess of the tribal forces and the steady, disciplined cohesion of the Romans.

Ultimately, the latter was to prove decisive in Rome's long fought conquest of Gaul. As noted above, the fierce charge of the Gauls and their individual prowess is frequently acknowledged by several ancient Roman writers.

Under their war leader Vercingetorix , the Gallic pursued what some modern historians have termed a "persisting" or "logistics strategy" - a mobile approach relying not on direct open field clashes, but avoidance of major battle, "scorched earth" denial of resources, and the isolation and piecemeal destruction of Roman detachments and smaller unit groupings.

According to Caesar himself, during the siege of the town of Bourges, the lurking warbands of Gauls were:. Caesar countered with a strategy of enticing the Gallic forces out into open battle, or of blockading them into submission.

At the town of Gergovia, resource denial was combined with a concentration of superior force and multiple threats from more than one direction.

This caused the opposing Roman forces to divide and ultimately fail. Gergovia was situated on the high ground of a tall hill, and Vercingetorix carefully drew up the bulk of his force on the slope, positioning allied tribes in designated places.

He drilled his men and skirmished daily with the Romans, who had overrun a hilltop position and had created a small camp some distance from Caesar's larger main camp.

A rallying of about 10, disenchanted Aeudan tribesmen engineered by Vercingetorix's agents created a threat in Caesar's rear, including a threat to a supply convoy promised by the allied Aeudans, and he diverted four legions to meet this danger.

Caesar dealt with the real threat, turned around and by ruthlessly forced marching once again consolidated his forces at the town. A feint using bogus cavalry by the Romans drew off part of the Gallic assault, and the Romans advanced to capture three more enemy outposts on the slope, and proceeded towards the walls of the stronghold.

The diverted Gallic forces returned however and in frantic fighting outside the town walls, the Romans lost men, including 46 centurions.

Caesar commenced a retreat from the town with the victorious Gallic warriors in pursuit. The Roman commander, however, mobilized his 10th Legion as a blocking force to cover his withdrawal and after some fighting, the tribesmen themselves withdrew back to Gergovia, taking several captured legion standards.

The vicious fighting around Gergovia was the first time Caesar had suffered a military reverse, demonstrating the Gallic martial valor noted by the ancient chroniclers.

The hard battle is referenced by the Roman historian Plutarch, who writes of the Averni people showing visitors a sword in one of their temples, a weapon that reputedly belonged to Caesar himself.

According to Plutarch, the Roman general was shown the sword in the temple at Gergovia some years after the battle, but he refused to reclaim it, saying that it was consecrated, and to leave it where it was.

The Gallic were unable to sustain their strategy, however, and Vercingetorix was to become trapped in Alesia, facing not divided sections or detachments of the Roman Army but Caesar's full force of approximately 70, men 50, legionnaires plus numerous additional auxiliary cavalry and infantry.

This massive concentration of Romans was able to besiege the fortress in detail and repulse Gallic relief forces, and it fell in little more than a month.

As historian A. Goldsworthy notes: "His [Vercingetorix's] strategy was considerably more sophisticated than that employed by Caesar's earlier opponents..

The Gauls gave battle at a place where they were inadequately provisioned for an extended siege, and where Caesar could bring his entire field force to bear on a single point without them being dissipated, and where his lines of supply were not effectively interdicted.

Together with a strong defensive anvil, the town supported by an offensive hammer the open field forces , and coupled with previous resource denial pressure over time, the Romans were forced to retreat, and the Gallic secured a victory.

As one historian notes about the persisting strategy:. In their battles against a wide variety of opponents, Rome's ruthless persistence, greater resources and stronger organization wore down their opponents over time.

Opponents could be relentlessly weakened and exhausted over the long run. As long as the Roman Senate and its successors were willing to replace and expend more men and material decade after decade, victory could be bought through a strategy of exhaustion.

The systematic wastage and destruction of enemy economic and human resources were called vastatio by the Romans. Crops and animals were destroyed or carried off, and local populaces were massacred or enslaved.

Sometimes these tactics were also used to conduct punitive raids on barbarian tribes which had performed raids across the border.

In the campaigns of Germanicus, Roman troops in the combat area carried out a "scorched earth" approach against their Germanic foes, devastating the land they depended on for supplies.

The Roman commander Severus avoided meeting the hard-fighting Jewish rebels in the open field. Instead, he relied on attacking their fortified strongpoints and devastating the zone of conflict in a methodical campaign.

Some historians note however that Rome often balanced brutal attrition with shrewd diplomacy, as demonstrated by Caesar's harsh treatment of Gallic tribes that opposed him, but his sometimes conciliatory handling of those that submitted.

Rome also used a variety of incentives to encourage cooperation by the elites of conquered peoples, co-opting opposition and incorporating them into the structure of the empire.

This carrot and stick approach forms an integral part of "the Roman way" of war. The Romans understood this concept very well and realized that training soldiers could include paying for his rations [food] , his salary, his armour, his armaments [weapons] , and a soldier's honorarium [which was paid to those who received honourable discharges].

With all this in perspective, they realized each individual soldier was a far too valuable resource to waste.

They knew the costs they were incurring for each soldier had to be quite similar on their enemy's side. So they developed a tactic that could cause a significant setback or even defeat for their enemy while only creating a limited risk for their own soldiers.

The basic principle behind these tactics was to disrupt their enemies' resources while increasing Roman resources.

Without a regular supply of food, water, and other commodities, armies would begin to starve or dehydrate, resulting in low morale or killing of fellow soldiers.

Cavalry opponents were one of the toughest challenges faced by the Roman infantry. Combining both missile and shock capability with extensive mobility, cavalry exploited the inherent weakness of the legion—its relatively slow movement and deployment.

Defeat by strong cavalry forces is a recurring event in Roman military history. Hannibal's great victory at Cannae considered one of the greatest Roman defeats ever was primarily an infantry struggle, but the key role was played by his cavalry, as in his other victories.

An even more dramatic demonstration of Roman vulnerability is shown in the numerous wars against Parthian heavy cavalry. Both types of troops used powerful composite bows that shot arrows of sufficient strength to penetrate Roman armour.

The cataphracts extended combat power by serving as shock troops, engaging opposing forces with their heavy lances in thundering charges after they had been "softened up" by swarms of arrows.

The Parthians also conducted a "scorched earth" policy against the Romans, refusing major set-piece encounters, while luring them deeper on to the unfavorable ground, where they would lack water supplies and a secure line of retreat.

The debacle of the Battle of Carrhae saw a devastating defeat of Roman arms by the Parthian cavalry. Roman casualties were approcimately 20, killed and 10, captured making the battle one of the costliest defeats in Roman history.

Parthian casualties were minimal. Clues exist in the earlier campaigns of Alexander the Great against mounted Asiatic warriors—engaging the horsemen with strong detachments of light infantry and missile troops and driving them off with charges by Alexander's heavy cavalry units.

The Roman variant, with its large manpower resources, continued the same "combined arms" approach, with a larger role for cavalry as the empire went on.

The Eastern half of the Roman Empire , particularly, was ultimately to rely mostly on cavalry forces. Adjustments of Ventidius. The operations of the Roman commander Publius Ventidius Bassus illustrate three general tactics used by the infantry to fight their mounted foes.

These drew on Caesar's veteran legions and made Ventidius one of the Roman generals to celebrate a triumph against the Parthians. In three separate battles, he not only managed to defeat the Parthian armies and drive them out of the Roman territory but also managed to kill Parthia's three top military commanders during the battles.

Combined arms and quick advance in later eras. In the later Roman empire, cavalry forces played a larger role, with the infantry in support. On June 22, a large-scale clash occurred near the town of Maranga.

Facing an enemy that threatened to blanket his troops with a hail of arrows, and in danger of envelopment, Julian deployed his force in a crescent formation, and ordered an advance by both infantry and cavalry on the double, thwarting both dangers by closing quickly.

The gambit was successful. After a long battle, the Persians withdrew- a tactical victory albeit a costly one for the Romans according to some historians.

Marcellinus's commentary also sharply contrasts the fighting spirit of the Persian infantrymen with those of Rome, stating that they had "aversion to pitched infantry battles.

Mixed results against major cavalry enemies. Rome's overall record against the Parthians was favourable, although the Parthian horsemen offered stiff resistance, as it was against the horsemen of Hannibal, and some Gallic opponents.

Subsequent Roman leaders like Antony invaded Parthian territory but had to withdraw after severe losses. Others like Severus and Trajan saw great success in their invasions of Mesopotamia, defeating Parthian armies through combined arms tactics.

Any history of the Roman infantry must grapple with the factors that led to the decline of the heavy legions that once dominated the Western world.

Such decline, of course, is closely linked with the decay of other facets of Rome's economy, society and political scene.

Nevertheless, some historians emphasize that the final demise of Rome was due to military defeat, however plausible or implausible the plethora of theories advanced by some scholars, ranging from declining tax bases, to class struggle, to mass lead poisoning.

There are a number of controversies in this area with duelling scholars advancing competing theories. Essentially it is argued that the increasing barbarization of the heavy legions weakened weaponry, training, morale and military effectiveness in the long run.

The weapons changes described above are but one example. It could be argued that the use of barbarian personnel was nothing new. This is accurate, however, such use was clearly governed by "the Roman way.

In the twilight of the empire, this was not the case. Such practices as permitting the settlement of massive, armed barbarian populations on Roman territory, the watering down of the privilege of citizenship, increasing use of alien contingents, and relaxation or removal of traditionally thorough and severe Roman discipline, organization and control, contributed to the decline of the heavy infantry.

The settlement of the foederati for example, saw large barbarian contingents ushered on to Roman territory, with their own organization, under their own leaders.

Such groupings showed a tendency to neglect "the Roman way" in organization, training, logistics etc. These settlements may have bought short-term political peace for imperial elites, but their long-term effect was negative, weakening the traditional strengths of the heavy infantry in discipline, training and deployment.

They also seemed to have lessened the incentive for remaining "old Guard" troops to adhere to such strengths, since the barbarians received equal or more favour with less effort.

Indeed, such "allied" barbarian contingents were at times to turn on the Romans, devastating wide areas with sack and pillage and even attacking imperial army formations.

Changes to the Roman forces that moved away from the old fighting organization order were thus the outcome of several influences, rather than simply the appearance of more, allegedly uncivilized non-Romans.

To combat the more frequent raids and advances of their hostile neighbours the legions were changed from slow and heavy to much lighter troops, and cavalry was introduced as a serious concept.

State-controlled factories produced vast quantities of less specialist arms such as chainmail armour and spears as opposed to the gladius and lorica segmentata more prevalent in the early empire.

The difference between auxiliaries and legionaries began to become negligible from an equipment point of view.

This meant that the new subdivided infantry lost the awesome power that the earlier legions had, meaning that whilst they were more likely to see a battle they were less likely to win it.

That legion size was at an all-time low was also a factor. On the other hand, legions in the late empire were used far more flexibly as accounts by authors like Ammianus Marcellinus make clear.

Smaller detachments waged more personal and smaller scale, yet intense operations against tribal foes on the Rhine and Danubian frontiers.

Instead of vast formations of thousands of troops, smaller units would engage smaller-scale incursions by raiders. Roman horsemen , while fast, were actually much too weak to cope with the very cavalry based invasions of the Huns, Goths, Vandals and Sassanids.

Their ineffectiveness was demonstrated at Cannae and Adrianople ; in both instances, the cavalry was completely destroyed by a vastly more powerful enemy horse.

Advances in Roman tactical thinking led to the adoption of eastern-style cataphracts and mass-use of auxiliary forces as cavalry, both of which were used to address previous shortcomings of the Roman army.

The later Roman army was more cavalry-orientated than it had been before and as a result, detachments were able to be moved around the empire at will, ending the previous doctrine of keeping all forces on the frontiers at the edge of the empire.

The "mobile reserve" strategy, traditionally identified with Constantine I , saw a reversal of the traditional "forward" policy of strong frontier fortifications backed by legions stationed near likely zones of conflict.

Instead, it is argued that the best troops were pulled back into a type of "mobile reserve" closer to the centre that could be deployed to trouble areas throughout the empire.

Some scholars claim this was a positive development, Luttwak, Delbruck , et al. Some writers such as Luttwak condemn the old-style "forward" policy as indicating a " Maginot Line " mentality in the troubled latter centuries of the Empire.

Ancient writers like Zosimus in the 5th century AD condemned the "reserve" policy as a major weakening of the military force.

Other modern scholars Ferrill et al. While the drop in quality did not happen immediately, it is argued that over time, the limitanei declined into lightly armed, static watchman type troops that were of dubious value against increasing barbarian marauders on the frontiers.

The pullback of the best infantry was based more on political reasons shoring up the power bases of the emperors and various elites rather than on military reality.

In addition, it is claimed, the "forward" policy was not at all a static "Maginot" approach, but that traditional heavy legions and supporting cavalry could still move to a trouble spot by redeploying them from fortifications elsewhere along a particular frontier.

Some scholars challenge the notion that a "mobile reserve" in the modern military sense existed in the Roman Empire, and instead argue that the shifts in an organization represent a series of field armies deployed in various areas as needed, particularly in the East.

Others point to the heavy fiscal difficulties and political turmoil of the later Empire that made it difficult to continue a traditional policy.

There are numerous other facets to the controversy, but whatever the school of thought, all agree that the traditional strengths and weaponry of the heavy infantry legion declined from the standards of earlier eras.

The 4th-century writer Vegetius , in one of the most influential Western military works De Re Militari , highlighted this decline as the key factor in military weakness, noting that the core legions always fought as part of an integrated team of cavalry and light foot.

In the latter years, this formula that had brought so much success petered out. This does not mean that heavy units disappeared entirely, but that their mass recruitment, formation, organization and deployment as the dominant part of the Roman military was greatly reduced.

Ironically, in Rome's final battles the Western half of the empire the defeats suffered were substantially inflicted by infantry forces many fighting dismounted.

Speaking of the decline of the heavy infantry, the Roman historian Vegetius lauded the old fighting units, and lamented how the heavy armour of the early days had been discarded by the weaker, less disciplined, barbarized forces:.

Historian Arther Ferrill notes that even towards the end, some of the old infantry formations were still in use. Such grouping was increasingly ineffective, however, without the severe close order discipline, drill and organization of old times.

He ordered his troops to ignore them and to attack the powerful Alans and Visigoths instead. It was a sad commentary on the force that had once dominated Europe, the Mediterranean and much of the Middle East.

Nevertheless, its day had already passed in favour of the mass levies of the barbarian federates. Some elements that made the Romans an effective military force, both tactically and at higher levels, were:.

The Romans were able to copy and adapt the weapons and methods of their opponents more effectively. Some weapons, such as the gladius , were adopted outright by the legionaries.

Publius asserts that the pilum was of Samnite origin, and the shield was based on Greek design. In the naval sphere, the Romans followed some of the same methods they used with the infantry, dropping their ineffective designs and copying, adapting and improving on Punic warships, and introducing heavier marine contingents infantry fighters on to their ships.

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